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TO WHAT EXTENT IS JUDICIAL INTERVENTION
AGAINST TORTURE A "HOLLOW HOPE"?
REFLECTIONS ON THE ISRAELI AND AMERICAN
JUDICIAL EXPERIENCES SINCE 2001
Sanford Levinson*
I begin with what should be obvious: I am sure that I am not the only person here
who regards Aharon Barak as a personal hero. I have been privileged to know him since
1984, when I met him while spending a semester in Jerusalem as a visiting professor at
the Faculty of Law at the Hebrew University. Many of his opinions have been genuinely
inspirational with regard to the role of the judge in helping to create the central aspiration
of our own Constitution, to establish justice and to create a more perfect Union. Whether
or not Barak was successful, as an empirical matter, he devoted his best efforts to what I
believe to be undeniably commendable goals, as one would expect of someone whose
jurisprudence emphasizes the necessity of a judge taking purposes into account when
construing legal materials. I am also sure that I am not unique in remembering not only
remarkable conversations at his dinner table, but also remarkable - almost literally
incredible - displays of hospitality. There was simply no hesitation on my part in
accepting the invitation to return to Tulsa to honor this truly wonderful judge and human
being.
The topic of the panel was what role judges should play with regard to monitoring
interrogation of those deemed threats to state security. When accepting the initial
invitation to participate, I pledged to offer some reflections on the American experience
over what is now a full decade since the iconic date of September 11, 2001. In the course
of transforming very sketchy intentions into an actual presentation and paper, however, I
found myself reflecting a great deal on the quite stunning differences between the
behavior of the Israeli Supreme Court and our own. Owen Fiss's accompanying paper is
an eloquent and heartfelt lament about the almost willful withdrawal of the United States
Supreme Court from consideration of many of the issues surrounding the "war on
terror," including interrogation.'
The interrogation of alleged terrorists - and its potential monitoring by the
judiciary - is a topic of obvious importance to Israel, which has from its inception
suffered from justified fear of those who wish the state and its people ill, even if some of
* W. St. John Garwood and W. St. John Garwood Jr. Centennial Chair in Law, University of Texas Law
School; Professor of Government, University of Texas at Austin. I am grateful to the editors of the Tulsa Law
Review for organizing this important symposium about one of the judicial giants of the past century.
1. Owen Fiss, Imprisonment Without Trial, 47 TULSA L. REv. 347 (2011).
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us also believe that on occasion the fears go beyond what is justified into near paranoia.
But, as the old joke goes, even paranoids have enemies, and one would have to be
willfully ignorant to believe that Israel is lacking in enemies. In more recent years, of
course, the same phenomena have been true of the United States, which basically
remains traumatized by the events of September 11. The attack on the World Trade
Center symbolizes an important development analyzed at length by my friend and
sometime colleague Philip Bobbitt. His fundamental work, Terror and Consent,
emphasizes, among other things, the role played now and into the foreseeable future by
the evil twin of NGOs, in this case the rise of well-organized non-state institutions -
Bobbitt sometimes refers to them as "virtual state[s]" - who have as one of their
defining projects, wreaking havoc through acts of terrorism.2 These acts, however
horrendous, are quite rational inasmuch as they are designed, in substantial measure, to
challenge the capacity of existing states to fulfill what is perhaps the most fundamental
responsibility of the state, which is to provide security against physical threats.
Thomas Hobbes famously attributed the rise of the modern state to the desire by
the populace for such security. Without the state, life is likely to be "nasty, brutish, and
short." 3 With a state - and, of course, in Hobbes's case an all-powerful sovereign
executive that he named "Leviathan" - life takes place under greater conditions of
security. As another great - and often ominous - political theorist, Machiavelli, writes,
for most people "it is enough to live secure" and to leave the practicalities of governance
to princes who will provide that boon.4 Both Hobbes and Machiavelli seem to describe
decidedly non-romantic citizens (or subjects), relying far less on patriotic identification
than on hard-headed calculation when deciding where their loyalties lie. This is
especially the case in a modem world where emigration is, especially for the well-
educated, well-off, or otherwise talented, a very real possibility. To the extent that the
state can no longer provide basic security, it will inevitably become delegitimized in the
eyes of its inhabitants.
Bruce Ackerman, a colleague of Barak's and Owen Fiss's at the Yale Law School,
expresses in the body of his work some especially interesting tensions with regard to the
state's necessity to instill confidence in its citizenry about its ability to provide basic
security. His most recent book, The Decline and Fall of the American Republic, is
written from a decidedly different perspective than Bobbitt's (or, for that matter,
Hobbes's or Machiavelli's). 5 In many ways, it is a perfect exemplar of what Adrian
Vermeule and Eric Posner have sneeringly dismissed as "tyrannophobia," 6 inasmuch as
it expresses an overriding concern that the United States is inexorably sliding into a form
of presidential tyranny. Indeed, the most recent manifestation for Ackerman (and others)
2. See PHILIP BOBBITT, TERROR AND CONSENT: THE WARS OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 93 (First
Anchor Books ed. 2009).
3. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 41 (Penguin Classics 1985) (1651).
4. Niccolo MACHIAVELLI, DISCOURSES ON Livy 46 (Harvey C. Mansfield & Nathan Tarcov trans., 1996).
5. BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC (2010).
6. Adrian Vermeule, Jr. & Eric Posner, Tyrannophboia (Univ. of Chi. Pub. Law Working Paper No. 276,
Harvard Pub. Law Working Paper No. 09-44, 2009); Adrian Vermeule, Jr. & Eric Posner, "Tyrannophboia:"
Speech at the University of Chicago Law School Conference on Comparative Constitutional Design (Oct. 16,
2009), available at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/audio/posnervermeulel01609 (leveling the same charges at
myself and Jack Balkin).
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of this slide is the almost casual assumption on the part of the Obama Administration that
it is up to the President alone to take one of the primary stories du jour, to decide
whether to impose a "no-fly zone" on Libya, a country with which the United States is
not at war. The Administration apparently relies on a mixture of the President's power
to conduct foreign relations and his role as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, an
argument that would have drawn significant opposition from many political liberals had
it been made in similar circumstances by the Bush Administration.
It may well be the case that the Obama Administration has sought approval for its
actions from the Office of Legal Counsel ("OLC") within the Department of Justice,
which, along with the growth of the White House Counsel's office, is the target of
independent critique by Ackerman. There is, of course, almost no sense in which one can
describe the quasi-judicial OLC as "independent." After all, one implication of the so-
called "unitary" view of the Executive Branch is that the President has plenary control
over the Department of Justice and any of its employees who are not covered by civil
service protections. The Attorney General is basically hired - and can be fired - by
the Chief Executive (subject to Senate confirmation at the hiring stage). I note, for what
it is worth, that this subordination of the Attorney General to the power of the Chief
Executive is rejected by 48 of the 50 American states, most of whom elect their attorneys
general who are and frequently are from the governor's own political party or otherwise
do not share the governor's own political agenda. For these states, the principle of
"attorney general independence" may be less important than the more commonly feted
'judicial independence." Each, after all, involves liberating these public officials from
undue influence by the executive branch, which, in Hamilton's telling in the Federalist,
is likely to be full of "energy" and thus, in our own language, constantly "pushing the
envelope" regarding the extent of executive powers.9
No one can address Justice Barak's remarkable career without being attentive to
his relentless independence. One should never forget that Barak was Israel's Attorney
General during the first Prime Ministry of Yitzhak Rabin. A description of this phase of
his career, found on an online encyclopedia, is worth quoting at some length:
From 1975 to 1978 Barak served in the prestigious, independent,
nonpolitical position of attorney general. His term of office was
marked by his decisions in several well-known cases to indict public
officials for political corruption. In 1977 Barak's decision to indict the
prime minister's wife for holding an illegal foreign bank account in
Washington, D.C., led the prime minister, YITZHAK RABIN, to
7. See Bruce Ackerman & Oona Hathaway, It's Not Up to the President to Impose a No-Fly Zone Over
Libya, HUFFINGTON PosT (March 9, 2011, 11:05 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/bruce-ackerman/no-
fly-zone-libya b 833426.html. Since writing these lines, the Obama Administration has also unilaterally
chosen to execute Anwar al-Awlaki, an American citizen living in Yemen through a drone attack (on the
ground that he was involved with Al Qaeda and constituted a threat to American national security). See, Charlie
Savage, "Holder Outlines Policy on Killing Terrorism Suspects, New York Times, March 5, 2012, available at
http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/03/05/holder-expected-to-outline-policy-views-on-killing-
citizens/?scp=3&sq=Holdero2Oon%20al-Awlaki%20killing&st=cse.
8. I note for the record, though it is a topic for a very different paper, that "unitary executive" buffs have a
hard time explaining the constitutionality of the Civil Service Act of 1886 and subsequent protections for civil
servants against retaliation by their political superiors.
9. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 70 (Alexander Hamilton).
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resign from office. Barak viewed his mission as attorney general to be
not only an adviser to the government, but also "adviser" to the
citizens of Israel in protecting their civil liberties. 10
Any discussion of the American response to September 11 should at least take
cognizance of the potential consequences for the American political system - and those
claiming to be victims of that system - of the fact that it is often quite difficult, either
formally or more "realistically," to describe the United States Attorney General as either
"independent" or "nonpolitical." The most scandalous example must surely be the
appointment of Robert Kennedy as John F. Kennedy's attorney general, even if, as is
generally agreed, he turned out to be an important and able Cabinet official. I dare say
there is less complacence about the appointment by Richard Nixon's appointment of his
campaign manager, John Mitchell, who of course went to jail in the aftermath of
Watergate, or George W. Bush's appointment of Alberto Gonzales, a hyperloyalist who
viewed his job basically as defending whatever Bush did. The point, incidentally, is not
only that Aharon Barak has greater integrity than Mitchell or Gonzales - or, for that
matter, Robert Kennedy - but also that the Israeli political system, for all of its
sometimes grotesque defects, has tried to maintain some kind of gap between the office
of Attorney General and the sometimes virulent political nature of the rest of the Cabinet.
This speaks, among other things, to the importance of constitutional design in providing
the institutional context within which individuals, whether saints or sinners, must carry
out their official commitments. Given, of course, that Israel does not have a formal
written constitution with regard to its institutional structures even if one regards the
"Basic Laws" as providing the equivalent of a Bill of Rights one might wonder if the
relative independence and autonomy of the Attorney General will be indefinitely
maintained.
Returning to the United States, though, no one can begin to understand the
American debate on torture (or other modes of interrogation) or the altogether crucial
issue of holding anyone accountable for what most of the world regards as American
misconduct without paying close attention to the those who staffed the OLC, whether it
be the head (confirmed by the Senate or not) or an unusually active member of the
Office, such as John Yoo. As a practical matter, in our era the OLC may be considerably
more important than almost all given federal courts, including, as a practical matter, the
Supreme Court of the United States. At the very least, it is probably more important who
is appointed as the Assistant Attorney General in charge of OLC than who is appointed
to any given federal court, including, quite possibly, the Supreme Court. Consider only
that one reason for what many of us regard as the highly questionable, if not indeed
disgraceful, failure of the Obama Administration to seek legal redress against those
Americans who participated in the "torture - or, if one wishes, 'merely' cruel or
inhumane' - regime," particularly during the first term of the Bush presidency, is the
argument that the OLC had in effect provided an immunity from prosecution to anyone
who might say, altogether plausibly, that they had been told by the "supreme court
10. Barak, Aharon (1936 ) - Personal History, Biographical Highlights, Personal Chronology:, Influences
and Contributions, Exploring, Influence on the Israeli Legal system, JRANK,
http:/encyclopedia jrank.org/articles/pages/5561 /Barak-Aharon-1936.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2012).
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within the executive branch" that their activities were legally unchallengeable. I confess
that I tend to agree with those who argue that it would therefore be unfair, and quite
possibly a violation of constitutional due process, to prosecute those who engaged in
good-faith reliance on legal opinions prepared by the OLC. One might well wish to deny
that "I was just following orders" from political or military superiors should necessarily
be accepted as a defense against prosecution, but it is harder, for me at least, to be as
dismissive of the claim that "I was following orders," whose legality was affirmed by
well-trained lawyers, many of whom, as is true of John Yoo, had graduated from the
Yale Law School and then clerked for the United States Supreme Court. To expect
laypersons to come to their own conclusions about the inadequacy of his lawyering
abilities is quite an extreme form of "legal protestantism" that rejects any deference to
ostensible professional and institutional authority.
Like many of us, no doubt, I know and admire particular lawyers who have been
part of the Office of Legal Counsel and have performed admirably and with great
distinction. But, as Madison reminded us, we design institutions not for "angels" but for
the ordinary run of men (and now women)" who may well be tempted to act far more in
the spirit of what Madison condemned as "faction" - including full-scale devotion to
enabling Presidents to do whatever they wish - than with full devotion to the
"permanent and aggregate interests of the community," which at least sometimes can be
defined as unblinking adherence to constitutional norms.12 Perhaps one should not
overestimate the importance of constitutional architecture, but surely some systems are,
at least marginally, more likely to produce admirable officials than others, especially if
the attributes of admiration include a willingness to defend the legal interests of
marginal, often deeply unpopular, members of the society. 13
Although I am, for example, an increasingly militant opponent of life tenure on the
United States Supreme Court and believe that Israel provides a better model, even at the
unfortunate cost of cutting short Justice Barak's stunning membership on its Supreme
Court, I would not support, say terms of only six years or a retirement age of, say, 60 or
even 65. My own preference would in fact be a single, non-renewable, eighteen-year
term, which I think would provide enough assurance of institutional independence and
the willingness to protect the legal and moral interests of people who are not part of the
polity but, in fact, committed to its destruction. But the point, at least for those of us in
the United States, is that those of us interested in effective monitoring of interrogation
are well advised to focus at least as much on the OLC than on the Supreme Court and
perhaps to join Ackerman in thinking of developing a more independent structure of
basically administrative courts.
But I want to suggest that Ackerman displays his own "Hobbesian moment" in his
previous book, Before the Next Attack. 14 He calls on Congress to adopt "framework
11. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison).
12. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).
13. Consider in this context Justice Scalia's dissent in the Hamdi case, which in many ways is entirely
admirable in its commitment to the importance of traditional norms of habeas corpus, but in other ways is
extremely troubling inasmuch as Scalia clearly limits the range of his concern to fellow American citizens and
not, for example, to Yasir Hamdan. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 554-78 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
14. BRUCE ACKERMAN, BEFORE THE NEXT ATTACK: PRESERVING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE AGE OF
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legislation" that would allow the United States, following the next terrorist attack, which
Ackerman regards as basically inevitable, to engage in wide-scale preventive detention
for a stated period of time - 45 days. 15 This would serve as a means of reassuring an
almost undoubtedly panicked public that the government is in fact trying to protect them,
whatever might be the failure signified by the attack itself. To be sure, Ackerman in no
way justifies torture or other means of what has euphemistically come to be called
"enhanced interrogation." This, however, is relatively cold comfort for some. Ackerman,
after all, accepts, in contrast to such critics as David Cole,16 the political wisdom of
preventive detention and suspension of habeas corpus, whereby definition the state need
offer no specified reason for its detention of ostensible suspects. Many of those detained,
almost certainly, will have "qualified" for their mistreatment by virtue of their ethnicity,
as was, of course, the case with the events we identify by invoking the name
Korematsu. 17
If one is willing to go that far in deviating from what we ordinarily view as our
basic constitutional norms, then why not go further and embrace harsh methods of
interrogation, including torture as the ultimate form of "enhanced interrogation?" 18
Surely millions of Americans agree with the always quotable Richard Posner: "[I]f the
stakes are high enough torture is permissible. No one who doubts that should be in a
position of responsibility,"l9 a position argued, more elegantly, years earlier by Michael
Walzer in his classic essay on "Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands."20 The
indefatigable Harvard law professor Alan Dershowitz, though himself personally
opposed to torture, nonetheless garnered much publicity by suggesting in effect that it
was inevitable that the United States would engage in torture under certain circumstances
and that it would be far better to impose an ex ante "warrant requirement" - quickly
dubbed "torture warrants" - than to rely on ex post legal monitoring and
chastisement.21 Dershowitz's own interest in torture, it is worth noting, was generated by
his displeasure with the Landau Commission's report in the 1980s that, he believed, was
far too latitudinarian in the discretion it was willing to assign to Israeli intelligence
-22operatives.
With regard to views within the United States, a recent article examining public
opinion polls asserts that torture was never supported by a majority of Americans
throughout the Bush Administration, though, for whatever reason, that apparently
TERRORISM (2006).
15. Id. at 55, 78.
16. David Cole, In Case of Emergency, THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS (Jul. 13, 2006),
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2006/jul/13/in-case-of-emergency/?pagination=false (critiquing
ACKERMAN, supra note 14).
17. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
18. On support for enhanced interrogation stopping short of torture, see for example PHILIP P. HEYMANN &
JULIETTE N. KAYYEM, PROTECTING LIBERTY IN AN AGE OF TERROR (2005). (It should be noted, though, that
critics of this approach often refer to the methods that are tolerated as "torture lite.").
19. Richard A. Posner, Torture, Terrorism, and Interrogation, in TORTURE: A COLLECTION 291, 295
(Sanford Levinson ed., 2004).
20. See Michael Walzer, Political Action the Problem ofDirty Hands, in TORTURE: A COLLECTION, supra
note 19, at 61, 64-65.
21. Alan M. Dershowitz, Tortured Reasoning, in TORTURE: A COLLECTION, supra note 19, at 257, 257-59.
22. See id. at 259-63.
368 Vol. 47:2
6
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 47 [2011], Iss. 2, Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol47/iss2/6
A "HOLLOW HOPE"?
changed in the early months of the Obama Administration.23 Still, there were certainly
many reports in the press that most Americans did in fact presumably feel reassured by
the belief that the Bush Administration would, in effect, do "[w]hatever it takes" to
confront those who wished the United States ill,24 even if a Gallup Poll taken in October
of 2001 showed that "only" 45% of the public would accept torture, as against the 77%
that would accept the assassination of known terrorists.25 Perhaps our assessments of
public opinion were skewed by the influence of influential pundits who seemed eager to
demonstrate their hard-headedness by embracing the cult of "[w]hatever it takes." 26 One
should also acknowledge, however, the possibility that many Americans continued to
believe that whatever the United States was doing fell short of "torture," so that
condemnation of "torture" did not, in any direct way equal opposition to American
methods of interrogation. After all, the Bush Administration never explicitly
acknowledged that it tortured, preferring to describe what they were doing only as
"enhanced" or "harsh" interrogation.27 Indeed, the notorious "torture memo" prepared by
John Yoo within the Office of Legal Counsel actually cited both an opinion of the
European Court of Human Rights involving British practices in Northern Island and
Justice Barak's famous opinion reining in methods of interrogation in Israel for the
proposition that the methods of interrogation considered (and condemned) in those
opinions were explicitly found not to be "torture," but only "cruel" and "inhuman"
violations of human dignity. 28 And a 2009 poll found that a majority of Americans in
retrospect supported such interrogation and felt that it had made them safer. 29
As captured by Ackerman's own focus on "the next attack," the concern is more
on preventing future events than catching the perpetrators of completed past events,
however satisfying that would undoubtedly be. 30 This accounts for the ubiquity of the
notorious "ticking time bomb" hypothetical, which by definition looks to the future and
not backwards to a bomb that has, in fact, exploded. 31 Almost no one today would
defend torture as a punishment for crime, and few, I suspect, would be tolerant if the only
23. Paul Gronke et al., U.S. Public Opinion on Torture, 2001-2009, 43 POL. SCL & POL. 437, 437-40
(2010).
24. See JANE MAYER, THE DARK SIDE 31 (2008) (on the Bush Administration); see also, e.g., Patrick
Flavin & David W. Nickerson, Reciprocity and Public Opinion on Torture (Baylor University Political Sci.
Dep't, Working Paper), available at
http://homepages.baylor.edu/patrick jflavin/files/2010/09/torture-reciprocity .pdf (on public opinion in 2005).
25. Darren K. Carlson, Would Americans Fight Terrorism by any Means Necessary? GALLUP (March 1,
2005), http://www.gallup.com/poll/15073/would-americans-fight-terrorism-any-means-necessary.aspx.
26. See MAYER, supra note 24, at 31.
27. See, e.g., Jan Crawford Greensburg, Howard L Rosenberg, & Ariane de Vogue, Sources: Top Bush
Advisors Approved Enhanced Interrogation,' ABC NEWS (April 9, 2008),
http://abcnews.go.com/TheLaw/LawPolitics/story?id=4583256&page=1 #.TzWw3sUeMsc.
28. See Memorandum from John C. Woo, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., to William J. Haynes II, Gen.
Couns. of the Dep't of Def. 69-71 (Mar. 14, 2003), available at
https://www.aclu.org/pdfs/safefree/yooarmytorture memo.pdf ("Torture Memo").
29. Chris Cillizza, The Monday Fix: In One Poll, 54% Say Harsh Interrogations Were Justified, THE
WASHINGTON POST, May 18, 2009, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/05/17/AR2009051702248.html?nav=emailpage.
30. ACKERMAN,supra note 14.
31. Bruce Anderson, Bruce Anderson: We not only have a right to use torture. We have a duty, THE
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aim were identifying those who committed already-performed crimes, however
important that may be. The context of the debate is almost entirely future-oriented, and it
takes place most often in societies that are, so to speak, terrified by the possibility of
terrorist activities.
I turn, therefore, to Justice Barak's great 1999 opinion "Concerning the Legality of
the General Security Service's Interrogation Methods," from which I drew substantial
excerpts for a book I edited, Torture: A Collection.32 He begins by noting not only the
relative frequency of various terroristic acts, but also that "many" such attacks "were
prevented due to the measures taken by the authorities responsible for fighting . . .hostile
terrorist activities on a daily basis." 33 Thus it is important to emphasize that the rationale
he ultimately gives for his decision to limit the possibilities open to the General Security
Service ("GSS") lies not in utilitarian calculation - does torture work? - but, rather,
the degree to which harsh methods of interrogation, whether or not they rise to the level
of torture, violate basic norms of constitutional democracy and the commitment to the
rule of law. "Our apprehension," Justice Barak wrote for himself and his colleagues, "is
that this decision will hamper the ability to properly deal with terrorists and terrorism,
[which] disturbs us." 3 4 However, they are pledged to enforce legal norms. "When we sit
to judge, we are being judged" precisely by reference to the unflinching willingness to
uphold existing norms without fear or favor.35
The issue before the Court was the authority of the GSS in the absence of statutory
authorization to engage in the interrogation practices invalidated in the course of Justice
Barak's opinion.36 To this extent, there are overtones of Justice Breyer's opinion in
Hamdan, which also emphasized the lack of congressional authorization for what the
Bush Administration was attempting to do. 37 The United States Congress, to its disgrace,
in effect called Justice Breyer's bluff; then-Republican Senator Arlen Specter denounced
the bill as unconstitutional but voted for it anyway, because he wished to retain his
position as Chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee. 38 (Fortunately, Specter was at least
partially vindicated by the Supreme Court's ruling to invalidate a crucial part of the
legislation.) 39 So one question that Justice Barak's opinion forces us to consider
concerns what would happen if the Knesset did explicitly authorize the GSS to engage in
whatever practices the GSS deemed necessary in the name of enhancing Israeli security?
One view, similar to those critics of executive overreaching in the United States who
focus only on the lack of explicit congressional authorization for the behavior in
32. Supreme Court of Israel, Judgment Concerning the Legality of the General Security Service's
Interrogation Methods (September 6, 1999), in TORTURE: A COLLECTION, supra note 19, at 165; see also
Judgment Concerning the Legality of the General Security Service's Interrogation Methods, 38 1.L.M. 1471
(1999).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 181.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 165-66, 180.
37. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 584 U.S. 557, 636 (2006).
38. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Senator Specter and the Law, N.Y. TIMES (May 20, 2010, 8:43 PM),
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/05/20/senator-specter-and-the-law/.
39. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 787-92 (2008).
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question,40 is that the Knesset has basically plenary - dare one say Hobbesian -
authority to permit torture. That is just what parliamentary sovereignty, especially in the
absence in a canonical written constitution, means.
But Justice Barak, who famously proclaimed the existence of a "legal revolution"
in Israel because of the passage of certain Basic Laws, hints in his opinion that
Blackstone may not reign in Israel and that the Supreme Court might therefore rein in an
overreaching Knesset. 41 After noting the possibility of the Knesset's passing "required
legislation," he adds the proviso that a "law infringing upon a suspect's liberty" must be
found in accordance with "the values of the State of Israel" and (in addition?) "is enacted
for a proper purpose, and to an extent no greater than is required."42 After all, Justice
Barak noted the fundamental principle of "human dignity" is declared so essential to the
post-War conception of Germany as a legal order that it is protected against
constitutional amendment. The concern for "human dignity" must have a universal
referent, applying to "the dignity of the suspect being interrogated" 43 as well as the
dignity of the suspect's presumptive target. "[V]iolence directed at a suspect's body or
spirit does not constitute a reasonable investigation practice."44 What we see hinted at -
and what is articulated far more extensively in his other seminal opinions on the Israeli
"security fence"45 and the propriety of "targeted killings"46 - is the articulation of what
has come to be called the "proportionality" doctrine, which is quite different from
American "balancing" doctrine, even when it takes the form of "compelling interest"
analysis.
Most American justices simply ask whether the state's interest is sufficiently
important and whether the means chosen to realize the interest are sufficiently closely
related to attaining the end in question. "Proportionality analysis," however, goes on to
ask whether the costs in terms of the basic moral commitments of the state are simply too
high. Thus, in his decisions involving the building of the so-called "security fence" and
the use of "targeted killings," Justice Barak does not stop with the finding that each is
related quite closely to protecting the security interests of the Israeli citizenry. Rather, as
he writes in the "security fence" case,
[I]t is insufficient that the administrative authority chose the proper
and most moderate means for achieving the objective; it must also
weigh the benefit reaped by the public against the damage that will be
caused to the citizens by this means under the circumstances of the
case at hand. It must ask itself if, under these circumstances, there is a
40. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Emergency Contexts Without Emergency Powers:
The United States' Constitutional Approach During Wartime, 2 INT'L J. CONST. L. 296 (2004); Samuel
Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Between Civil Libertarianism and Executive Unilateralism: An Institutional
Process Approach to Rights During Wartime, 5 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 1 (2004).
41. Judgment Concerning the Legality of the General Security Service's Interrogation Methods, 38 I.L.M.
1471 (1999).
42. Id. at 1488.
43. Id. at 1482.
44. Id.
45. See generally HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Vill. Council v. Gov't of Isr. 58(5) PD 807 [2004] (Isr.),
available athttp://elyonl.court.gov.il/files eng/04/560/020/a28/04020560.a28.pdf.
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proper proportion between the benefit to the public and the damage to
the citizen. 47
Thus the Court tasks Israeli officials with "creat[ing] an arrangement which will avoid . .
. severe injury to the local inhabitants, even at the cost of a certain reduction of the
security demands." 4 8 Or, as Justice Barak wrote in the "targeted killings" case, "[t]hese
preventative strikes, with all the military importance they entail, must be made within the
framework of the law . . . It is when the cannons roar that we especially need the laws." 49
In elaborating on the proportionality doctrine, Justice Barak writes that "[i]t is a
manifestation of the idea that there is a barrier of values which democracy cannot
surpass, even if the purpose whose attainment is being attempted is worthy." 50 He quotes
an earlier opinion in which he notes that "human rights cannot receive their full
protection, as if there was no terrorism," but, at the very same time,
state security cannot receive its full protection, as if there were no
human rights. A delicate and sensitive balancing is needed. That is the
price of democracy. It is a dear price, which is worthwhile to pay. It
maintains the strength of the state. It makes the State's struggle
worthwhile. 5 1
The only cavil I would offer is that Justice Barak may be placing too much weight on the
word "democracy," since I think what he is really referring to is an explicitly liberal
version of democracy that, in Ronald Dworkin's formulation, takes rights very seriously
indeed.
In any event, I presume that Justice Barak admires the decision by the German
Constitutional Court to invalidate a law passed by the Bundestag that assigned to the
President of the German republic the authority to order the shooting down of a civilian
aircraft that, having been hijacked by terrorists, was presumed to be on its way to, say,
downtown Berlin and the Reichstag.52 That decision, of course, emphasized the basically
Kantian commitment of the post-War German Constitution to protect "human dignity" at
all costs, including refusing to destroy an airplane that, by definition, included many
passengers who were totally innocent of any terrorist inclinations. 53 Even if we are glad
that the German Constitutional Court acted as it did, would we really expect (or want)
German officials to feel bound by the decision should the actual eventuality come to
pass? Might we not predict they would act to defend the interests of the German state
and society and then plead "necessity" or otherwise throw themselves on the mercy of
understanding adjudicators, including, of course, the possibility of amnesty or pardon,
depending on the specifics of the legal system? Would we, that is, want them, in
47. HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Vill. Council v. Gov't of Isr. 58(5) PD 807, para. 59 [2004] (Isr.).
48. Id. atpara. 71.
49. HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Gov't of Isr., [Dec. 11, 2005] slip op. para. 61 (Isr.).
50. Id. at para. 45 (citing an unpublished opinion by Justice Barak, HCJ 8276/05 Adalah-The Legal Ctr.
for Arab Minority Rights in Isr. v. Minister of Def. (Isr.)).
51. Id. at para. 62 (quoting HCJ 7015/02 Aiuri v. Military Commander of the Judea & Samaria Area, 56(6)
PD 352, 383 (2002) (Isr.)).
52. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Fed. 15, 2006, ENTSCHEINGUNGEN
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Walzer's formulation, to "dirty" their hands? 54 These are not, I should point out,
conventional rhetorical questions, as they admit, I think, to more than one answer.
After all, whatever the insistence by the Israeli Supreme Court that there could be
no ex ante justification for torture and other inhumane methods of interrogation, which
seems, among other things, to eliminate any possibility of adopting Dershowitzian
"torture warrants," the opinion carefully left open the possibility of presenting an ex post
"necessity" defense. 55 Israeli criminal law theorist Miriam Gur-Arye offered an
interesting critique of a "necessity" defense, as against a claim of "self-defense." She
argues that claim of "necessity" opens the way to torturing, say, the family of a terrorist
suspect on the rational ground that that might be far more likely to procure the desired
information than torturing the suspect himself.56 To require a demonstration of "self-
defense," however, cuts off any such possibility, since the person against whom one
engages in "self-defense" must pose the direct threat, as would certainly be untrue with
regard, say, to the alleged terrorist's child.5 7
There is an additional problem generated by reliance on ex post enforcement of
legal norms against torture and other unacceptable means of interrogation. At least
within the criminal context, this requires that state officials initiate prosecutions, at
which the defendant can plead necessity. But, as is often pointed out, such prosecutions
are extremely rare, save against those who can be portrayed as "rogues," such as those in
charge of prisoners at Abu Ghraib. Though one can easily agree that they deserved
prosecution, it is also the case that they have almost nothing in common with the
"dedicated professionals" within the GSS, CIA, or other similar agencies who are given
access to those deemed to be "high-value" suspects (which those incarcerated at Abu
Ghraib were most definitely not). Moreover, within the United States, there is the
question not only of prosecutorial discretion, but also of "jury nullification," not to
mention judicial discretion regarding the sentence or opportunities for executive
clemency. All of these obviously make torture and other harsh interrogation something
other than what might be called a "strict liability" offense with mandatory levels of
punishment that cannot be evaded. To the extent that we would have reservations about
strict liability and mandatory punishments - and my experience is that few would
actually endorse strict liability and a mandatory sentence of, say, twenty years in prison
with no possibility of pardon or parole - I suggest that is evidence of our own
uncertainty that all such methods of interrogation can be analyzed with an identical
template, a topic we might pursue in the discussion.
I want, though, to raise an awful question that is more central to my declared topic:
How much hope can we really put in courts not only to act honorably and
conscientiously, which Justice Barak and his associates most certainly did in the GSS
case, but also to have genuine effect on those whose behavior they are trying to
influence? No court in the entire world has displayed a greater willingness to monitor
54. See Walzer, supra note 20.
55. Supreme Court of Israel, supra note 32, at 180.
56. Miriam Gur-Arye, Can the War against Terror Justify the Use of Force in Interrogations? Reflections
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official behavior involving basic issues of national security than did the Israeli Supreme
Court under Justice Barak's leadership. 58 But, wearing my interdisciplinary hat as a
political scientist, I suggest that we must still ask if the relevant authorities changed their
behavior sufficiently to justify the hope placed in the judiciary.
One response, of course, is "who knows?", not least because of the difficulty in
getting relevant evidence. Consider the sobering conclusions reached by the
distinguished American journalist Joseph Lelyveld, the former managing editor of The
New York Times, who wrote an anguished article for the Times following a visit to Israel
in 2005, at the height of the debate in the United States about torture. 59 Lelyveld notes,
for example, that Israeli security chief Ami Ayalon not only was "not surprised" by the
decision of the Israeli Court, but also that he "promptly announced that his interrogators
would obey the court." 60 It is worth quoting a length the next paragraph from Lelyveld's
article:
That may sound like a happy ending, a triumph for the rule of law. But
what actually changed? Not as much as the sweeping judicial edict
seemed to promise, according to the Public Committee Against Torture
in Israel, a human rights group that seeks to monitor what happens to
detained Palestinians. The committee maintains that Ayalon's pledge
to abide by the Supreme Court's decision was never wholly enforced
and seriously broke down after the outbreak of the second intifada.
Torture remains routine in Israeli detention centers, the committee
contended, offering affidavits taken within the last year [i.e. 2004]
from prisoners like Bahij Mahmoud Bader, who, in a statement
summarized by the group, said that after his arrest last July, his
interrogators actually "put before him a list of the methods of torture
that they later used." Then they worked down the list, forcing him to
stand facing a wall with his hands tied behind his back and his knees
bent for hours at a time; blindfolding him and slapping him; seating
him backwards on a chair with his hands and feet bound in a painful
position while two interrogators, one behind and one in front, shoved
his upper torso back and forth as if playing catch with a medicine ball.
As usual, curses, threats and denial of sleep were all chapters in his
story. Later, so he testified, he was informed that his wife and mother
had been arrested and that his family home might be demolished if he
failed to cooperate. 6 1
Lelyveld acknowledged, though, that there were more optimistic renderings of the
aftermath of the decision as well, including those offered by the human rights group
B'Tselem and the Palestinian Human Rights Monitoring Group. Jessica Montell, the
58. It is necessary to note, for the record, that Justice Barak has critics from the left who believe that the
Court could in fact have done even more than it did, as opposed to his right-wing critics who attack him for
according suspected terrorists any legal rights.
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American-born director of B'Tselem, described Israel as having "a very important lesson
to teach the United States," as she pointed to what Lelyveld described as "a new restraint
in Israel since the Supreme Court's ruling." 62 Still, almost no one seems to believe that
"new restraint," even if genuine, means that objectionable methods of interrogation, as
described by Justice Barak's opinion, have entirely disappeared or, more to the point,
could not be authorized as "special methods" by the chief of Israeli security, whatever
the opinion might have suggested. So it is worth quoting one of the concluding paragraph
of Lelyveld's ruminations on his trip to Israel, in which he noted the absence of any
follow-up cases that might test current practices of the Israeli security agencies:
Hannah Friedman, executive director of the Public Committee Against
Torture in Israel, explained why her group had yet to bring such a case
to the Supreme Court. She had been warned that if the committee
brought a new case alleging torture at a time when suicide bombings
had aroused public opinion, it might provoke a decision that would
weaken the legal standard that had just been raised. Under those
circumstances, even the committee against torture must have felt it had
to be realistic. 63
Any political scientist or legal sociologist would be unsurprised by the almost
certain difference between "law on the books," in this case, the opinion of the Israeli
Supreme Court, and the "law in action." There is almost always "slippage." The
question, obviously, is the extent of such slippage and its frequency, which, equally
obviously, is difficult, if not impossible, to find out.
I also note the release in 2009, on the 1 0 th anniversary of Justice Barak's opinion,
of a report by The Public Committee Against Torture in Israel ("PCATI"),
Accountability Denied: The Absence of Investigation and Punishment of Torture in
Israel, that was quite scathing in its conclusions. 64 "Israel [has no] genuine mechanism
for investigating complaints of torture," 65 says the PCATI, which "result[s] in absolute
immunity for interrogators who commit grave crimes."66 Among other things,
complaints are checked by an active GSS agent who is the official in charge of checking
interrogee complaints.67 His recommendations not to open a criminal investigation are
universally accepted by the high ranking attorney in charge in the Ministry of Justice and
by the Attorney General.68 All of this, together with additional layers of protection for
torturers, including GSS exemption from the obligation to provide audio or video
recording of interrogations; - a dual system for keeping interrogation records;
systematic denial of the detainee's right to meet an attorney; and the deliberate
concealment or withholding of detainee medical records lead to the fact that each and
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Accountability Denied: The Absence of Investigation and Punishment of Torture in Israel, THE PUB.
COMM. AGAINST TORTURE IN ISR. PERIODIC REPORT DEC. 2009 (2009), available at
http://www.stoptorture.org.il/files/Accountability Denied Eng.pdf.
65. Id. at 93.
66. Id.
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every torture complaint in Israel is shelved with no investigation and no justice. 69
According to data provided by the State, since 2001 more than 600 complaints of torture
by GSS agents were submitted while not even a single criminal investigation was
opened. 70
Let me put it as bridge players might say, "review the bidding" with regard to
this overview of one of Justice Barak's greatest decisions and its aftermath. First of all,
there is the decision and Justice Barak's eloquent opinion explaining its basis. If one
assigns to the judiciary a certain kind of tutelary role that encourages citizens to
internalize an appropriate view of their society and their responsibilities as members of
such a society, then this opinion, as is true of many examples of the Barak oeuvre, plays
this role in exemplary fashion. And, of course, as already suggested, there is good reason
to believe that at least some public officials will take such opinions seriously, even if
there is indeed some slippage between what the opinion might seem to require and what
these officials are in fact willing to do. "Israel is a small country," writes Lelyveld, "in
constant conversation with itself at all levels of society." 7 1 Anyone who has ever visited
Israel knows how intense political conversations can be among all sectors of society, not
to mention the entitlement felt, at least by Israeli Jews, to express their own distinct
opinions and to form a political party that might, under Israel's remarkable - and many
would say dysfunctional - threshold rules, end up electing someone to serve in the
Knesset.
What is the case in the United States, especially if we confme our attention to the
United States Supreme Court? The answers are almost uniformly disheartening. First of
all, that Court has utterly failed to speak out with regard to American interrogation
practices. There is almost literally nothing that can be quoted with regard to teaching the
public about what it might mean to adhere to, what we would like to think are, basic
American norms during time of war. Indeed, Justice Scalia has publicly confessed his
appreciation for the fictitious Jack Bauer, the "hero" of 24, who never hesitated to torture
those he deemed threats to American interests.72 Probably the most eloquent judicial
statement against modem interrogation is found in Justice Stevens's dissenting opinion
in the Padilla case:
Executive detention of subversive citizens, like detention of enemy
soldiers to keep them off the battlefield, may sometimes be justified to
prevent persons from launching or becoming missiles of destruction. It
may not, however, be justified by the naked interest in using unlawful
procedures to extract information. Incommunicado detention for
months on end is such a procedure. Whether the information so
procured is more or less reliable than that acquired by more extreme
forms of torture is of no consequence. For if this Nation is to remain
true to the ideals symbolized by its flag, it must not wield the tools of
69. Id. at 9-13.
70. Id. at 11-12.
71. Lelyveld, supra note 59.
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tyrants even to resist an assault by the forces of tyranny.73
One should be grateful to Justice Stevens, but it is a sad statement that a dissenting
opinion is the best we can come up with. What explains the remarkable paucity of
relevant statements from the Supreme Court, which, after all, has often been praised as a
unique "forum of principle"? One answer involves the similar failure of the Bush and
Obama Administrations, for their own reasons, to hold any public officials accountable,
beyond very low-level military personnel who had almost nothing to do with "high-
value" suspects. That is, there are no convictions to assess because there are basically no
prosecutions. That is just what prosecutorial discretion means, which is, of course, one of
the reasons for Dershowitz's controversial emphasis on the importance of ex ante
procedures that would create a basically strict liability offense for anyone who had failed
to invoke such procedures.74
But, of course, there could also be civil cases, in which victims of illegitimate
interrogation sue their interrogators or, more broadly, the United States as being liable
for the acts of their agents. As a matter of fact, such cases which were filed have been
met by invocations of the "state secret" privilege, which basically allows the United
States to avoid even appearing in Court once it claims that national security interests
require that relevant evidence not be disclosed, under any circumstances, to a court. But,
of course even if, what the Constitution calls "inferior courts," accept such claims or
otherwise make it basically impossible to seek legal redress - by offering broad
readings of doctrines providing "immunity" to public officials for actions they took in
"good faith" as part of their "official responsibilities" - one might expect the Supreme
Court to review a swathe of these cases in order to delineate the reach of doctrines that,
almost by definition, work against the interests of those deprived of important liberty
rights or dignitary interests (or both) by the United States. Instead, the Supreme Court
has almost literally looked away when victims of those practices, including
"extraordinary rendition" of alleged terrorists to other countries where torture is rife,
have filed civil suits against the United States and relevant public officials and then
appeal verdicts against them. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, for example,
dismissed an attempt by a Canadian, Maher Arar, who was seized in transit at the John F.
Kennedy airport in New York and "rendered" to Syria, where he was tortured. 75 The
Canadian government, after reviewing their own participation in the event, formally
apologized to Mr. Arar and paid him a significant amount of damages.76 The United
States, on the other hand, has vigorously, and successfully, fought any attempt to hold it
(or us) accountable for the injustice visited upon Mr. Arar. 7 Former Yale Law School
Dean Guido Calabresi was one of four dissenters from the Circuit Court decision.
"[W]hen the history of this distinguished court is written," Calabresi wrote, "today's
majority decision will be viewed with dismay."7 And the United States Supreme Court
73. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 465 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
74. See Dershowitz, supra note 21.
75. Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009).
76. Scott Horton, Second Circuit Affirms Dismissal of Arar, HARPERS (Nov. 2, 2009, 5:57 PM),
http://harpers.org/archive/2009/11 /hbc-90006024.
7 7. Id.
78. Arar, 585 F.3d at 630 (Calabresi, J., dissenting).
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refused to grant a petition for certiorari, 79 which is additional cause for dismay.
The United States Supreme Court can do this, in large part, because of the fact that
it enjoys almost plenary authority regarding what cases it hears. The Supreme Court
hears only those cases it wishes to, and, obviously, they need not explain to anyone, least
of all the litigants claiming to have been the victims of oppression, the reasons for their
failure to take any given case. Whether out of cowardice or admirable prudence, based
on careful calculation of when the Court can effectively intervene and when, in contrast,
they should leave decisions entirely in the hand of so-called "political branches," the
Court has chosen to remain silent. It is worth noting that one of the distinct contributions
that Justice Barak made to the Israeli judiciary was a conception of what Americans
might call "citizen standing," whereby his Court welcomed rather than rebuffed those
who sought vindication of what they believed were their legal rights. This also means, to
be blunt, that he worked far harder than does any member of the United States Supreme
Court, for one implication of a generous view of standing is that courts will have more
cases to decide and opinions to write. I suspect that Justice Barak would have greatly
enjoyed having to write only approximately ten "opinions for the Court" a year, plus
whatever concurring or dissenting opinions he might have wished to write. That is
basically the workload of an American Supreme Court justice, given that recent courts
have decided fewer than 90 cases per year. And, of course, each justice has four clerks to
help draft and write the opinions they do write, whereas I am quite confident that in
reading a Justice Barak opinion, we are hearing his own unique voice.
All I can say in conclusion is, "Long live that voice, and may it be joined by other
judges in other lands."
79. Id, cert denied, 130 S. Ct. 3409 (2010); see also Rasul v. Meyers, 563 F.3d 527 (D.C. Cir. 2009), cert
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